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ABSTRACT
Public support for renewables has led to an unexpected investment momentum
in Germany. A consequence is reduced wholesale electricity prices, the so-called
merit order effect of renewables. We estimate this reduction using an econometric
approach and give a quantitative overview of the ﬁnancial situation of conven-
tional generators. Our results indicate that investments in new conventional ca-
pacities are economically unviable. With the current market design, this situation
is going to impact supply security at least in the long run. A popular approach to
address this issue is the introduction of additional public support for conventional
power plants. However, we believe that subsidizing renewable and conventional
capacities contradicts the idea of a liberal market. We present two alternatives:
State control of investments in renewables through auctions (as proposed by the
European Commission), and a premium paid to representatives of the demand
side (such as retailers) dependence of their shares of renewables.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Public support of renewable electricity normally aims at ensuring recovery of total cost
plus a given return on investment. For wind and photovoltaics (PV), total cost consists almost
exclusively of investment cost. However, in liberalized electricity markets, all power is indiscrim-
inately sold on the same market. Having almost no marginal cost, wind and PV power generation
are preferred in the merit order over coal-ﬁred and gas-ﬁred power generation. State aid in favor
of renewables therefore implies reduced operation hours of conventional generators, particularly
for combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT). Under current European market conditions, they have
higher marginal cost than coal-ﬁred power generators. The squeezing out of gas-ﬁred power gen-
eration by renewables reduces wholesale power prices which in turn has a negative impact on the
proﬁtability of conventional power plants. This effect is called the merit order effect of renewables.
There are several studies that have quantiﬁed the merit order effect of renewables. Our study also
presents estimates for the merit order effect to give a quantitative overview of the ﬁnancial situation
of power producers but it differs from most other studies in that we do not use a complex funda-
mental model of the electricity market but a simpler econometric approach.
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However, our main goal is not a mere quantiﬁcation of the merit order effect but rather
its implication on the current contribution margins of the remaining power generators that do not
beneﬁt from governmental support. In market economies, declining prices usually lead to declining
supply. But in the case of renewables, support schemes prevent standard market reactions. In the
end, potential investors might even call for public support to build conventional generation capac-
ities to provide security of supply, especially in times of little wind and sun (backup capacities). If
governments were to accept such claims, both types of capacities (renewable and conventional)
would end up being subsidized. In our opinion, this is obviously a contradiction to the idea of
liberal electricity markets. We present two alternative concepts that may solve the described di-
lemma. The ﬁrst concept is the state control of renewable generation investments through auctions
as proposed in the guidelines of the European Commission on renewable energy state aid (Brussels
2014/C 200/01). The second concept is a modiﬁed support scheme to representatives of the demand
side in favor of renewables which accounts for overcapacities in the market for electricity genera-
tion.
In the next section 2, we give a short overview of the market for electricity and the support
scheme for renewables in Germany. In section 3, we estimate the merit order effect of renewables
to facilitate the understanding of the current ﬁnancial situation of conventional power producers.
We present and discuss the ﬁrst alternative market concept consisting of renewable capacity auctions
in section 4 while we present and discuss our second market concept consisting of premiums for
renewable power generation to representatives of the demand side in sections 5 and 6 before con-
cluding this manuscript in section 7.
2. BACKGROUND
State aid in favor of renewable electricity generation has led to an unexpected investment
momentum in many countries. In the case of Germany, the generation share of renewables increased
from 5 percent to about one third within a time frame of only 15 years. In 1990/1991, feed-in fees
for renewable electricity generation were introduced (Electricity Feed-In Act 1990) to stimulate
innovation and technical progress. In 2000, the support scheme was extended in order to incentivize
the market integration of renewable power generation against the resistance and market power of
incumbent utilities. For the time being, the explicit aim of the German support scheme is a share
of at least 35% renewable generation until 2020. The feed-in fees are set to correspond to the
technology-speciﬁc full cost of renewable power generation1 and are legally secured for a period
of 20 consecutive years after commissioning.2 Assuming ongoing technical progress, it was foreseen
that feed-in fees decline with the year of installation. For many technologies however, this decline
had been reverted by amendments (approximately every third year).
On the one hand, thanks to this generous support in Germany, installed capacities of wind,
PV, and biogas combined already exceed the annual peak load which is about 80 Gigawatts. On
the other hand, expenditures for the state aid are skyrocketing. In Germany and many other coun-
tries, the state aid is not ﬁnanced via public budgets but by a levy on electricity consumption. The
resulting market distortion is indicated in Table 1 which shows the total ﬁnal user expenditures of
1. In the case of onshore and offshore wind, the payments also depend in a rather complex way on the location of the
installation.
2. Furthermore, unproduced electricity which has not been produced due to the intervention of system operators is also
awarded with the feed-in payment
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Table 1: Electricity expenditures of ﬁnal consumers in Germany, 2010–2014
*) Excluding expenditures for auto-generation; data source: Independent Expert Commission 2015, p. 80
electricity in Germany. In recent years both the support for renewable electricity and the grid fees
have passed the total expenditures for electricity generation incl. marketing and sales.
Due to the merit order effect of renewables, wholesale electricity prices have fallen below
marginal cost even of highly efﬁcient CCGT. Thus, investments in conventional generation capac-
ities deemed to be necessary in the long run have been cancelled. In addition to this, several modern
units have been taken out of operation. However, gas-ﬁred power plants are regarded as being ideal
backup units due to their potentials for a ﬂexible operation.
In fact, the withdrawal of investment projects is a typical market reaction to situations with
obvious production overcapacities. Investors are waiting until they anticipate an increase in whole-
sale prices which allows them to achieve expected rates of return. However, this simple market
mechanism does not apply for subsidized renewables in Germany. The renewable energy policy
legally guarantees cost recovery (more or less) and thus eliminates the economic incentive to adapt
investment behavior to market conditions. Accordingly, the market for electricity becomes increas-
ingly distorted.
Following the lack of market signals to control the investments into renewable generation,
operators of wind and PV plants have an unusually attractive business environment which obviously
cannot be sustainable for the power system in the long run. Governments may eventually proceed
to also guaranteeing cost recovery to fossil generators that are deemed necessary to secure electricity
supply. However, we believe that more market-oriented alternatives are also suitable to provide
supply security. We will present and discuss two of them in the last part of this paper. But ﬁrst, to
improve the understanding of the context of these solutions, we estimate the merit order effect of
renewables for 2014.
3. MERIT ORDER EFFECT OF RENEWABLES
In competitive day-ahead markets, hourly prices usually correspond to marginal cost of
generation. As already explained, increasing generation from wind and PV leads to decreasing
wholesale electricity prices, the so-called merit order effect of renewables. The present section is
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Table 2: Merit order effect estimates of wind and PV in Germany, 2006–2012
Data source: Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (2014), p. 38.
dedicated to enable a better understanding for the current ﬁnancial situation of conventional gen-
erators by estimating the merit order effect of renewables in 2014.
Several studies have quantiﬁed this merit order effect in Germany in the past. An overview
of ex-post results for the German day-ahead market is presented in Table 2. Most of them are based
on fundamental models (structural models) where supply and demand functions are explicitly mod-
eled, speciﬁed, and estimated starting from the economic theory of marginal cost pricing. To esti-
mate the merit order effect of renewables, these models calculate the optimal least-cost power plant
dispatch assuming there is no wind and PV feed-in and derive average day-ahead prices. These
average prices are compared with average prices resulting from the optimal power plant dispatch
if wind and PV feed-in are included.
In contrast to fundamental (structural) models, econometric (reduced form) models are the
result of solving the system for endogenous variables expressing them as a function of exogenous
variables. Such an approach is used in vbw (2011) and Cludius et al. (2013). In these studies, an
econometric approach (reduced form model) is used to quantify wholesale power prices. Again,
the model compares two cases, with and without wind and PV. In our manuscript, such an econo-
metric estimation is proposed for a three year period between 2012 and 2014 (1,096 days).
In the literature, fundamental models are usually preferred over econometric models when
making market forecasts because of the model’s higher degree in detail. However, fundamental
models require a much larger data basis (e.g. production capacities and efﬁciency rates of all
generators, failure rates of generators, etc.) and thus, have a higher degree in complexity. In our
case, however, the goal is to make a hypothetical backcast of the market instead of a forecast
resulting in a lower level of uncertainty. We assume that for such a purpose, choosing a less complex
econometric model instead of a more complex fundamental model is appropriate. Our model takes
hourly day-ahead prices ph,t (in Euros/MWh) as dependent variables. These data are deﬁned as
pooled cross-sectional time series whereby the cross sections represent the 24 hours {h, h = 0,. . .,23}
of a day and the time series represent the 1,096 days.3 The implicit assumption is that the power
price of say the 9th hour of the day is dependent on the 9th hour of the previous day (reﬂected by
an autoregressive term) but not on the 8th hour of the same day. This assumption is not quite correct
as shown by the correlation matrix of the residuals (see appendix Table A.2). The alternative
3. Due to missing data of independent variables, the coverage is 1053 hours (96%).
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speciﬁcation would be a regular time series model with 24 x 1,096 = 26,304 hourly data points.
However, thanks to the robustness of the underlying relationship, such a speciﬁcation leads to the
same results and conclusions as the pool model we propose.
The endogenous variable is explained by a number of independent cross-section speciﬁc
variables
PVh,t Hourly day-ahead forecasts for photovoltaic generation (MWh)
WINDh,t Hourly day-ahead forecasts for wind generation (MWh)
Pcoal,t-1 Daily spot market coal price (API2 in Euros/t)
Pgas,t-1 Daily spot market gas price (Euros/MWh)
Pco2,t-1 Daily spot market price of European emission allowances (Euros/t CO2)
Forecasts for wind and photovoltaics are taken from the joint data platform4 of the four
German transmission system operators, hourly and daily price data from the European Energy
Exchange5. Daily data (e.g. fuel and CO2 prices) are converted into hourly data by assuming that
hourly data are equal for all hours of the same day.6 The implicit assumption is that opportunity
cost of fossil power generation is equal for all 24 hours and depends on day-ahead gas, coal, and
emission prices. In addition, a number of daily dummy variables have been included. They take
price effects into account for days during the daylight saving period DS, Saturdays, Sundays, and
public holidays. Furthermore, in order to eliminate the effect of electricity price outliers, two vari-
ables SPIKESup and SPIKESdown are included. These variables are positive on days where the physi-
cal price index (Phelix-Base) consisting of the average of the 24 prices is above 55 Euros/MWh
(outliers exceeding the 0.95 percentile) or below 17 Euros/MWh (outliers falling below the 0.05
percentile). In both cases this holds for about 55 of the 1,096 days in the estimation period. Both
outlier variables are normalized to one so that all price peaks have values between zero and one.
In addition to the twelve cross-sectional speciﬁc variables, two variables are included that
have a common effect on all hours of the day, a dummy variable for the Christmas season and the
endogenous variable delayed by 7 days. Thus, the full model comprises of 12 x 24 + 2 = 290
coefﬁcients to be estimated. The mathematical formulation of the model can be found below, see
equation (1).
p = a + a PV + a WIND + a p + a p + a p (1)h,t h,0 h,1 h,t h,2 h,t h,3 coal,t–1 h,4 gas,t–1 h,5 co2,t–1
+ a DS + a SAT + a SUN + a HOLIDAY + a SPIKES6 t h,7 t h,8 t 9 t h,10 up,t
+ a SPIKES + a CHRISTMAS + a ph,11 down,t 12 t 13 h,t–7
Besides the variables used in our equation, others would surely be relevant also, for ex-
ample temperatures, heating degree days or cooling degree days. But regarding the size of the
country, it is difﬁcult to decide which of the many (daily or hourly) data series should be used. In
addition, collinearity problems with PV may arise. But to assess the impact of renewables on the
electricity prices, we believe the proposed model to be sufﬁciently complex.
4. See https://www.netztransparenz.de/
5. See https://www.eex.com/en/market-data/
6. For days without fuel trading, the prices of the day before are used. Thus we assume constant fuel prices during
weekends according to the closing price of Fridays.
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Table 3: Overall descriptive statistics of the variables used in the model
Hourly / daily data between 2012 and 2014; Data source: EEX, TSOs, own calculations.
Table 3 presents the overall descriptive statistics of variables used in the model (except
for dummy and spike variables). The cross-sectional descriptive statistics are shown in the appendix
(see appendix Table A.1). According to Table 3, the average wholesale electricity price was 37.72
Euros/MWh varying between –222 and + 210 Euros/MWh in the period from 2012 to 2014. During
that time, the average natural gas price was 26.05 Euros/MWh while the price for CO2 emission
allowances was 5.94 Euros/t. With these ﬁgures, the economic challenge of gas-ﬁred electricity
generation in Germany becomes quite obvious.7
To correct for the observed serial correlation of the residuals, a cross section speciﬁc
autoregressive estimation AR(1) with a lag of one day is applied. This adds another 24 AR(1)-
coefﬁcients to the model. The estimation results of the pooled least squares regression usingWhite’s
cross-section standard errors and covariance (robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation) are
highly signiﬁcant with more than 87 percent of the variance of the dependent variable being ex-
plained. The AR(1)-term is 0.4 on average with a maximum of 0.612 for the 17th hour.
The estimation results of the main parameters are shown in Table 4. As expected, all
coefﬁcients explaining the price effect of forecasted wind feed-in are negative and highly signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level. This also applies for forecasted PV feed-ins between 8.00 a.m. and 8.00 p.m.
The given results can be used to simulate hourly electricity wholesale prices for these three
cases: with wind and PV feed-in, without PV feed-in, and with neither wind nor PV feed-in. Figure
1 shows the results as an ordered price curve for the year 2014. In this ﬁgure, the ﬁrst hour is the
hour with the highest price in 2014, the second hour the one with the second highest price, and so
forth. The average simulated day-ahead price for 2014 is 33.70 Euros/MWh. Without PV, the
average simulated price would be 38.28 Euros/MWh. According to Figure 1, the PV price effect
is unevenly distributed. It is high if the day-ahead price is high and low if the price is low. This
corresponds to the fact that PV tends to reduce peak prices and has quite a little effect on off-peak
prices during the nights.
7. Assuming a fuel efﬁciency of 55% and a CO2 output of 0.3 t per MWh electricity generated, the marginal cost of gas
generation would be 26.05/0.55 + 0.3x5.95 = 49.15 Euros/MWh
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Table 4: Main results of the Pooled Least Squares Estimation
** signiﬁcant at 1% level; * signiﬁcant at 5% level. Data source: 1,053 induced observations (days), 25,067 total obser-
vations; Source: Own calculations.
Without wind and PV, the average simulated day-ahead price is 45.73 Euros/MWh. In
contrast to PV, the price effect of wind is distributed quite evenly over the 8,760 hours of the year
which reﬂects the random nature of wind generation. Taking PV and wind together, the merit order
effect of renewables in 2014 can be quantiﬁed to about 12 Euros/MWh. Following these results,
the average day-ahead price in 2014 would have been 36 percent higher than the one observed if
there had not been any electricity feed-in from wind and PV generation in 2014.8
As a consequence of the signiﬁcant (and further growing) merit order effect of renewables,
conventional power producers are losing contribution margins and therefore their economic foun-
dation. However, conventional plants are essential for securing electricity supply in times of little
wind and sun (at least as long as renewables are not able to guarantee a full market supply). Because
energy supply security is one of the foundations for national welfare (see another of our publica-
8. Due to declining wholesale electricity prices and market coupling in northwest Europe, German net electricity exports
are growing and have surpassed 8 percent of the national electricity generation in 2014. Thus, growing renewable electricity
generation in Germany also implies a merit order effect in the neighboring countries which in turn also challenges the
economics of electricity generation there.
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Figure 1: Ordered day-ahead prices in Germany 2014
tions), it seems necessary to clarify the roles of renewables and backup capacities in future power
systems by either revising the support scheme for renewables or by introducing an additional support
mechanism in favor of conventional backup capacities.
A ﬁrst step along this line is the amendment of the Renewable Electricity Act in 2014.
With the amendment, an upper bound for the share of renewables has been introduced in addition
to the already existing lower bound. To be more precise, the target for renewable electricity is now
set to a range between 40 and 45 percent in 2025.9 One of the instruments to ensure achievement
of this revised target is the introduction of ﬂexible feed-in payments: If wind or PV investments in
a certain period exceed a predeﬁned level, new installations receive a reduced premium and vice
versa. Such a system had already been introduced successfully for PV when new installations had
surpassed 7,000 MW in a year while the government only expected about 2,500 MW. As a con-
sequence, payments for new installations had been reduced and brought new PV installations down
to roughly 2,000 MW per year. It is to be expected that ﬂexible wind premiums would generate
similar effects.
However, it is questionable whether or not such measures would be sufﬁcient to overcome
the market distortions. With the current market design, a renewable share of 40 to 45 percent in
2025 might turn out to be incompatible with a reliable investment environment for backup gener-
ation in spite of the expected phase-out of the remaining 11 GW nuclear capacities in Germany
until 2022. A policy induced premature decommissioning of further conventional (inﬂexible) ca-
pacities might ease the issue of overcapacities. However, such a strategy would lead to stranded
costs which need to be borne either by the owners of the plants, the consumers, or the tax payers.
In the following sections, we will present and discuss two alternative solutions to such a revision
9. Another modiﬁcation is that ﬁxed feed-in payments have been replaced by payments of a so-called “market premium”
which covers the difference between the politically estimated generation costs and the monthly average wholesale market
price.
Copyright © 2016 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
Renewable Electricity and Backup Capacities: An (Un-) Resolvable Problem? / 97
of the support scheme for renewables: auctions for renewable generation capacities and a market
premium which is oriented towards backup capacities.
4. AUCTIONS FOR CONTROLLING INVESTMENTS INTO RENEWABLE
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
There are several advantages if the government bases support for renewable capacities on
auctions. In our opinion, the most important one is that the level of state aid is determined by market
forces and not by some ministerial bureaucracy or external consultants. We will not discuss the
implementation of such auctions in detail (for this, see for example Nielsen et al. 2011, Maurer and
Barroso 2011, Fraunhofer and Ecofys 2014). However, we want to stress out that the ﬁnal advantage
depends on the design of the auctions. In order to have an auction outcome that is unaffected by
market power, a larger number of potential investors needs to participate. Even though this is easily
said, it might prove to be difﬁcult to put into practice because companies would need to be pre-
qualiﬁed regarding their qualities in engineering and management to participate in the auctions.
Additionally, to prevent strategic behavior of bidders, market participants should also be required
to provide some ﬁnancial guarantee in case investment projects will not be realized in due time.
Furthermore, for obvious reasons, contract bidders should be required to already have signed con-
tracts with landowners prior to the auction. Altogether, this restricts the number of possible bidders.
As not all bidders can usually be successful in the auctions, some potential investors may need to
write-off planning costs. The bidding price will normally also account for the associated ﬁnancial
risks. With this, the required state aid per unit of renewable electricity generation may even exceed
the one given in the present support scheme.
These points are well understood by the regulators and solutions have been developed that
seem to work in practice. However, a crucial issue remains: As long as renewable capacities are
not competitive and cannot be ﬁnanced by wholesale electricity prices alone, capacity auctions
allow direct control of government or state regulators over investments. Auctions should always
select the lowest bidders but, eventually, the cost of renewable electricity generation depends on
technology, geographic location, and plant size.10 Should such auctions also incentivize a certain
variety of technologies and geographies, their conditions need to be speciﬁed with respect to these
dimensions. However, as long as the government or a state regulator deﬁnes these conditions,
auctions become an obvious instrument of centralized investment planning. When deﬁning auction
volumes, governments may still respect politically deﬁned renewable targets. But they may also be
tempted to reduce auction volumes in order to prevent further increases in retail prices, avoid
bottlenecks in transmission and distribution grids, or prevent generation overcapacities and stranded
cost of conventional generation and hydropower capacities.
But once state auctions for renewable electricity capacities are in place, the same instru-
ment may also be applied to keep conventional generation capacities from leaving the market or to
incentivize new generation or storage capacities that are regarded to be necessary in order to secure
the electricity supply in times without wind and sun.11 In particular, representatives from the utility
industry regard such auctions for conventional backup capacities as necessary because the current
energy-only markets with their short-term marginal generation cost regime are unable to provide
sufﬁcient income to justify investments.12
10. This is especially important if a limited power grid is only able to accommodate additional generation capacities in
certain locations.
11. A likely parameter for deﬁning eligible technologies is a cap on speciﬁc greenhouse gas emissions.
12. Given the currently rather low electricity wholesale prices due to overcapacities, it is obvious that a free market
auction would hardly be able to satisfy this expectation in the near future.
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Eventually, national governments are bound to virtually receive total control over all gen-
eration capacities by organizing auctions for renewable capacities, conventional backup capacities,
and possibly also storage capacities. With this, all awarded bidders will receive payments on top
of the wholesale power prices once their investment projects are accomplished and are starting to
operate. The payments may be reﬁnanced through state budgets or through surcharges on electricity
bills. In the end, both will lead to state aid according to the deﬁnition of the European Commission:
“State aid is deﬁned as an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to
undertakings by national public authorities”.13 In such an environment, hardly any plant operator
will be able to ﬁnancially survive over time unless receiving state aid through successful partici-
pation at the auctions.
The original promise of the electricity market liberalization in the European Union was
that the market should be able to select its own cost-efﬁcient generation portfolio in order to gain
a more efﬁcient electricity supply. However, in the context of state auctions, this promise will no
longer hold. The effect of these auctions is that the generation portfolio will be deﬁned by state
authorities and that electricity prices will no longer depend on free negotiations and trades among
market participants but rather on deals between potential investors and governmental authorities. It
is quite astonishing that state-deﬁned auctions for renewable or conventional capacities are often
regarded as market-based instruments. Even though the instrument of state auctions is a valid option
to manage the electricity market, we are pleading for a categorization as an instrument of planned
economies, given the fact that the electricity generation market will be under control of state bu-
reaucracies or powerful interest groups. However, from the free market perspective, this seems to
be a rather high price to pay for the management of overcapacities.
Many governments have implemented other concepts in order to deal with the issue of
overcapacities, but the interventions seem to be somehow arbitrary. An example is the recent amend-
ment of the German Renewable Energy Sources Act 2014. With this act, the renewable support
will be temporarily suspended if hourly day-ahead wholesale prices are negative during six con-
secutive hours. The aim of this rule is obvious: Renewable generators should reduce their electricity
production in periods of extreme oversupply. For technical and institutional reasons14, the ﬂexibility
of most thermal power stations is limited so that they may still produce at negative wholesale prices.
In comparison, the downward ﬂexibility of wind and PV systems is large so that they should be
the ones to react on price signals. But one may question the six-hour period of negative wholesale
prices. It appears quite easy for larger aggregators of electricity to inﬂuence the wholesale power
prices in such a way those six consecutive hours with negative prices will or will never occur.
Other governments have applied more drastic interventions at the expense of renewable
electricity generation to overcome the issue of generation overcapacities. In extreme cases, support
schemes were fully withdrawn with retroactive effect. Obviously, these and similar government
interventions avoid excess generation capacities. However, we believe that unsystematic and un-
foreseeable political decisions are a hindrance to any stable development of the renewable energy
industry. For these reasons, we propose a different approach in the following sections.
13. The consequence is that the designs and the outcomes of all auctions are to be controlled by the European Com-
mission so that national governments will not have the last word.
14. Examples are must-run power stations with system service responsibility as well as combined heat and power stations
which are operated according to the heat demand.
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Figure 2: Contract for differences as support scheme for renewables (current situation)
5. MARKET PREMIUMS TO CONTROL INVESTMENTS INTO RENEWABLE
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Usually, economists assume that the optimal way to deal with excess generation capacities
would be to let market forces to do their job while governments should only intervene to prevent
the abuse of market power and to internalize negative externalities. The following two ﬁgures
illustrate how this basic idea can be applied to feed-in premiums paid to renewable electricity
generators.
Figure 2 shows the basic support scheme which is known under the term “contract for
differences” and is presently implemented in several countries. Sometimes, the level of the average
day-ahead price is insufﬁcient to cover total cost of electricity generation. Currently, this holds true
for both gas turbines and renewables in Germany. However, renewable generators receive premiums
that cover the difference between (individual) generation cost and average day-ahead price. Ac-
cordingly, the premium leads to cost recovery even if produced renewable electricity is sold at low
market prices. But as long as there is no state support for investments in gas turbines or other
backup technologies, investments in these technologies remain uneconomical. If backup invest-
ments are assumed to be necessary, one solution might lie in some sort of state aid (see section 3)
that covers the difference between total average cost and realized day-ahead price. This support
would bring backup capacities in a similar economic situation as generation technologies from
renewable sources. However, this leads to the downsides that we discussed in section 3.
Figure 3 illustrates an alternative approach to this double subsidization. In the alternative
approach, the market premium in favor of renewables is reduced. Here, it is not average day-ahead
prices that serve as a benchmark but rather average prices necessary to allow total cost recovery of
investments in the most cost-efﬁcient backup technology. As we can see, the day-ahead price shown
in Figure 3 fails to justify any investments in generation capacities (renewable and non-renewable).
Actually, these situations arise if there are overcapacities present in the system. However, due to a
lack of incentives to invest in new plants, overcapacities are going to decrease over time and day-
ahead prices are going to start increasing again. At some point, both, backup and renewable in-
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Figure 3: Reduction of market premiums to the level of backup cost (alternative approach)
vestments are going to be economically viable again and the paradox of incentivizing investments
in new (renewable) production capacities in a situation where the market suffers from overcapacities
will be solved.
However, this alternative approach is also associated with several issues. One of these
issues is the determination of average day-ahead prices necessary to cover total cost of the most
cost-efﬁcient backup capacity. Using the following steps, we quantify the average day-ahead price
needed for cost recovery.
• First, a preselection of potential backup generation technologies is required. Eventually, the
backup technology which covers an expected capacity shortage in future periods in the most
cost-efﬁcient way should determine the answer.
• Second, an assessment of expected annual full-load hours for, let us assume, the next ﬁve to
ten years is necessary. The full-load hours depend on the load and the available controllable
generation capacities that remain after the decommissioning of old plants at the end of their
economic lifetime.
• Third, the total cost of each technology has to be quantiﬁed. Because of the variable cost
such as for fuel and emission allowances, the result also depends on the full-load hours.
For any backup technology to be economically viable, total annual generation cost need
to be covered by revenues. Therefore, expected day-ahead prices must remain above average gen-
eration cost for at least the annual full-load hours. Figure 4 illustrates this with the example of two
backup technologies operating with natural gas: open cycle gas turbines (GT) and CCGT. The
sample data used in these examples are shown in Table 5.
Figure 4 shows price duration curves based on prices in 2014. The ﬁgure explains which
average day-ahead price would have been needed to cover the total cost of the most cost-efﬁcient
backup capacity. If an assumed future generation capacity shortage that needs to be covered by a
backup capacity investment has a proﬁle of only 1,000 hours per year, the open cycle GT is the
most cost-efﬁcient technology available. In the given case, the open cycle GT requires a day-ahead
price of at least 145.02 Euros/MWh for these 1,000 hours (compared to 169.00 Euros/MWh for a
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Table 5: Sample data for gas-ﬁred backup generation technologies
Figure 4: Ordered day-ahead prices in Germany allowing for backup investments
CCGT). If we expect the remaining part of the price duration to be unaffected by the backup
investment,15 the necessary day-ahead price must be at least 43.02 Euros/MWh on average to render
the investment viable (compared to 45.76 Euros/MWh for CCGT with 1,000 hours per year).
15. This is a simpliﬁed assumption that might be modiﬁed in a more reﬁned version of the approach.
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Assuming that a future capacity shortage has a higher proﬁle of 4,000 hours, choosing CCGT over
the open cycle GT would be the better economic alternative. In this case, a day-ahead price of at
least 79.26 Euros/MWh is required during these 4,000 full-load hours (compared to 94.27 Euros/
MWh for an open cycle GT). If the remaining day-ahead prices stay unchanged outside of these
4,000 hours, the CCGT investment would become viable at an average day-ahead price of at least
49.28 Euros/MWh.
Comparing these results with the average day-ahead price in 2014 of 32.76 Euros/MWh,
it becomes obvious that investments in neither CCGT nor open cycle GT are currently economically
viable. If we take into account the merit order effect of renewables for 2014 (about 12 Euros/MWh,
see section 3), we can assume that investments in open cycle GT would be economically viable
without wind and PV feed-in. As for CCGT investments, an increase of the average day-ahead
price by another 4.50 Euros/MWh would be necessary.
The solution discussed so far would induce a reduction of the market premium for in-
vestments into renewable generation by roughly 12 to 20 Euros/MWh. Eventually, such a reduction
disincentivizes investments into renewable generation capacities and, thus, alleviates the present
situation of generation overcapacities. This seems particularly important for offshorewind capacities
with high capacity factors of about 50 percent. If such a reform were to be passed, the expected
day-ahead prices would increase over time and investments into both, renewable and backup gen-
eration technologies, would be economical again at some point.
However, there is an important shortcoming with this approach: The share of renewable
power generation may not grow according to the politically deﬁned targets. One conclusion would
be that the target of certain shares of renewables is incompatible with the vintage structure of present
generation capacities. Following this conclusion, ordered market conditions can only be reestab-
lished with a slower pace of renewable energy investments or a politically forced phase-out of
conventional generation capacities. While the ﬁrst option is politically unpopular, the second option
causes high stranded costs and may perhaps be prohibited by legal courts that regard this as a
restriction on the freedom of trade.
A deeper analysis leads to the following assessment of the problem: The proposed reduc-
tion of market premiums for generation from renewable sources creates a situation in which both,
conventional and renewable generation technologies, are equivalent in the economic sense. With
this, a reduced premium would be neutral with respect to competition between different technolo-
gies. However, the political intention is to have a biased competition in favor of renewables. But
instead of a political intervention on the supply side of the market, the regulator may also intervene
on the demand side in favor of renewables.
6. THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF THE ELECTRICITY DEMAND
In order to shift market preferences towards renewable capacities, we propose giving
incentives to representatives of the demand side instead of offering incentives to producers of
renewable energy. Representatives of the demand side might be large industrial customers, elec-
tricity retailers, and other so-called balancing responsible parties. Of course, the government could
also subsidize renewable energy technologies from the supply instead of the demand side. However,
by applying pull mechanisms aimed at the demand side, governments give market forces the op-
portunity to ﬁnd innovative and ﬂexible solutions that are likely be precisely tailored to accom-
modate larger shares of renewables in the electricity market. We believe that the prospects of gaining
competitive advantages would be a sufﬁcient stimulus for companies to work out solutions to
successfully integrate an increasing share of intermittent supply.
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One possible approach would be to impose a certain renewable portfolio standard on
balancing responsible parties which requires them to purchase a predetermined and over the time
further increasing share of electricity from preregistered renewable generators. However, such a
measure would obviously be another rather strong regulative intervention. Again, there is an alter-
native to such a regulated imposition. Instead of imposing shares of renewables, we propose a
monthly premium that is paid to balancing responsible parties according to their monthly share of
ﬂuctuating renewables in their power sales portfolio. The proposed premium should be offered in
Euros per kWh electricity sold, and be equal to zero if shares of renewables in the sales portfolios
remain below a certain minimum threshold. On the other hand, the premium should increase in
proportion to the shares of renewables. The effect of such a premium would be a motivation of
electricity retailers to prefer electricity from renewables instead of from conventional technologies.
A point of criticism to this suggestion could be that renewable shares in electricity sales
portfolios are physically limited by the ability to reliably secure supply. However, this physical
limit is variable and can be increased with the implementation of electricity storages, power-to-heat
devices, ﬂexible and interruptible loads, and other demand-sided instruments. Therefore, in addition
to just incentivizing the demand for renewables themselves, the premium would also serve as a tool
to support these kinds of innovations that allow the integration of higher shares of renewables in a
reliable power system. If a rather unsatisfying development of renewable generation is observed,
the government could raise the premium to stimulate further increases.
Taking it one step further, it seems reasonable to embed such a concept into a European
framework. In the beginning, support payments to retailers could be deﬁned by a national govern-
ment and ﬁnanced by its consumers. However, once the support scheme satisﬁes European standards
regarding state aid, European retailers purchasing electricity from undertakings listed in a European
database of admitted renewable generators would then be eligible to receive the proposed market
integration premium. Ideally, this premium would be ﬁnanced by consumers in the country where
the electricity is consumed.
7. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the current support of renewable power generation has a strong impact
on wholesale electricity prices (merit order effect of renewables). We presented a pooled cross-
sectional time-series model to quantify the merit order effect for 2014. The results indicate that
renewable power generation led to an average discount in wholesale prices of approximately 12
Euros/MWh (about 36 percent of the observed baseload price). A consequence of a merit order
effect in such an order of magnitude is contribution margins which are insufﬁcient to justify in-
vestment in conventional (backup) generation capacities. With the current market design and further
increases in shares of renewables, this might even impact supply security (at least in the long run).
In this manuscript, two different concepts are presented to solve this issue. The ﬁrst concept
is an auctioning mechanism for renewables (supply-sided mechanism) granting the regulator control
over investments in renewable generation capacities as proposed in the guidelines of the European
Commission on renewable energy state aid (Brussels 28.6.2014; 2014/C 200/01). However, we
believe that such a measure on the supply side would be a rather strong regulative intervention of
the government.
The second concept is a monthly premium paid to power retailers and other representatives
of the demand side depending on the share of ﬂuctuating renewables provided in their sales portfolio
(demand-sided mechanism). In our opinion, such a demand-sided approach is much more ﬂexible
and is even capable of supporting solutions to integrate larger shares of renewables into the power
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markets (such as backup generation capacities, electricity storage systems, or demand side man-
agement). By allowing the market itself to ﬁnd an optimal solution for the integration of renewables,
the idea of liberal markets in the electricity sector would be valued.
However, even if our concept were to be accepted, a transition from the present support
system to such a new system would still be a great administrative challenge because a multitude
of different stakeholder and interests would be involved. But our proposal has an even more im-
portant shortcoming. On the one hand, the supply side (renewable and conventional generators) is
heavily lobbying for support payments, capacity premiums, and other state aids and these claims
would be at risk. On the other hand, retailers and balancing group managers from the demand side
currently do not request any support even though it might be reasonable. Eventually, a reform of
renewable electricity support along these lines might just turn out to be politically inopportune.
A. APPENDIX
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of key variables for the merit order estimation
Copyright © 2016 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.































Copyright © 2016 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
106 / The Energy Journal
REFERENCES
Cludius, J., Hermann, H., Matthes, F. 2013. “The Merit-Order Effect of Wind and Photovoltaic Electricity Generation in
Germany 2008–2012”, CEEM Working Paper 3-2013, Sydney, Australia.
Electricity Feed-in Act of 1990, Gesetz u¨ber die Einspeisung vom Strom aus erneuerbaren Energien in das o¨ffentliche Netz
(Stromeinspeisungsgesetz). Bundesgesetzblatt I, 2633, 1990.
Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy, 2014. “Zweiter Monitoring-Bericht “Energie der Zukunft””. Berlin, Germany,
(www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Publikationen/zweiter-monitoring-bericht-energie-der-zukunft.pdf).
Fraunhofer / Ecofys, 2014. “Design features of support schemes for renewable electricity”. Utrecht, The Netherlands,
(ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/ﬁles/documents/2014_design_features_of_support_schemes.pdf).
Fu¨rsch, M., Malischek, R., Lindenberger, D. 2013. “Der Merit-Order-Effekt der erneuerbaren Energien – Analyse der kurzen
und langen Frist”. Ko¨ln: Energiewirtschaftliches Institut EWI, Cologne, Germany, (www.ewi.uni-koeln.de/ﬁleadmin/
user_upload/Publikationen/Working_Paper/EWI_WP_12_14_Merit-Order-Effekt-der-Erneuerbaren.pdf).
Independent Expert Commission, 2014.“Stellungnahme zum ersten Fortschrittsbericht der Bundesregierung fu¨r das Ber-
ichtsjahr 2013”. Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy, Berlin, Germany, (www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/
M-O/monitoringbericht-energie-der-zukunft-stellungnahme-2013).
Maurer, L., Barroso, L. 2011. “Electricity Auctions: An Overview of Efﬁcient Practices”. The World Bank, Washington
D.C., USA. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-8822-8.
Nielsen, S., Sorknæs, P., Østergaard, P. 2011. “Electricity market auction settings in a future Danish electricity system with
a high penetration of renewable energy sources – A comparison of marginal pricing and pay-as-bid”. Energy 36, 4431–
4444. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2011.03.079.
Renewable Energy Sources Act of 2000. Gesetz fu¨r den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien (EEG). Bundesgesetzblatt I, 305,
2000 (www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/eeg/gesamt.pdf).
Renewable Energy Sources Act of 2014. Gesetz fu¨r den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien (EEG 2014). Bundesgesetzblatt I,
1066, 2014 (www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/eeg_2014/gesamt.pdf).
Sensfuß, F., Ragwitz, M. 2006. “Analyse des Preiseffektes der Stromerzeugung aus erneuerbaren Energien auf die Bo¨rsen-
preise im deutschen Stromhandel”. Fraunhofer-Institut fu¨r System- und Innovationsforschung (ISI), Karlsruhe, Germany.
Sensfuß, F., Ragwitz, M ., Genoese, M. 2008. “The merit-order effect: A detailed analysis of the price effect of renewable
electricity generation on spot market prices in Germany”. Energy Policy 36, 3086–3094. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.enpol.2008.03.035.
Speth, V., Stark, M. 2012. “The impact of wind and solar on peak and off-peak prices—Evidence from a two year price
analysis”. Paper presented at the IAEE European Conference, Venice. (www.webmeets.com/ﬁles/papers/AIEE/2012/451/
Abstract_IAEE_2012_Electricityprices.pdf).
vbw 2011 “Kosten des Ausbaus der Erneuerbaren Energien. Mu¨nchen: vbw – Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft e.V.”
(www.baypapier.com/ﬁleadmin/user_upload/Downloads/Standpunkte/Studie_Kosten_Erneuerbare_Energien.pdf).
Weigt, H. 2009: “Germany’s wind energy: The potential for fossil capacity replacement and cost saving”. Applied Energy
86, 1857–1863. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2008.11.031.
Copyright © 2016 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
